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Jurisdictional Statement
The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to hear this case because the alleged
crime committed by the Defendant in violation of Utah law purportedly occurred in the
Sixth Judicial District, Sevier County, in the State of Utah where he was originally on
trial for criminal charges and those proceedings have resulted in a final order for this
Court to review.
Statement of Issues
The first main issue is whether the jury made a clearly erroneous finding of guilt
based on the lack of sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly and intentionally possessed or used a
controlled substance.
The second main issue is whether the jury made a clearly erroneous finding of
guilt based on the lack of sufficient direct and circumstantial evidence proving beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia.
Assuming, but not conceding, the Court concludes that the Defendant did, in fact,
possess drug paraphernalia, the third main issue is whether the jury made a clearly
erroneous finding of guilt based on the lack of sufficient direct and circumstantial
evidence proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed drug
paraphernalia with intent to use it, and to use it for at least one of these purposes: to plant,
propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process,
prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or
otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the human body.
5

The fourth main issue is whether the trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain
language of the U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 when it allowed the jury's finding to remain as
sufficient, which simply found, "with regard to Count 2, guilty, possession of drug
paraphernalia, a Class B misdemeanor" {Transcript, p. 338), but the jury's finding
entirely failed to mention whether the Defendant had any intent to use the particular drug
paraphernalia for any of the twenty-two explicit purposes listed under the statute.
The fifth main issue is whether the trial court abused its discretion when it denied
Defendant's motion to dismiss the charge of possession based on a broken chain of
evidence when the court itself stated that "we may not have exactly a perfect chain of
evidence or chain of custody." Transcript, p. 241.
The sixth main issue is whether the case should have been dismissed under the
doctrine of plain error or abuse of discretion because of the spoliation of evidence when
the State failed to bring forth a requested urine sample it initially said was lost, but then
represented it was still in existence.
The seventh main issue is whether the case should have been dismissed under the
doctrine of plain error because of the State withholding potentially exculpatory evidence
in the form of a non-produced urine sample that had been requested twice by motions and
which the State continued to assert was not lost at trial.
The eighth main issues is whether the trial court erred in rejecting the Defendant's
proposed jury instruction that is consistent with case law regarding the State's need to
preclude

all

reasonable

possibilities

or

6

alternate

hypotheses

of

innocence

in

circumstantial evidence cases in order for a defendant to be found guilty beyond a
reasonable doubt.
Standard of Review
The Court will need to apply the following standards:
The material findings are clearly erroneous because all the evidence supporting the
findings is legally insufficient to support the findings when viewed in a light most
favorable to the trial court's findings in this matter.
Furthermore, the trial court abused its discretion in denying Defendant's motions
and/or granting the State's motions.
In addition, the trial court incorrectly interpreted the plain language of the Utah
Constitution and Utah statutes.
Lastly, there was also plain error in not dismissing the case because there was (1)
error (2) that is plain (3) that affected substantial rights of the Defendant and (4) which
error seriously affected

the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial

proceedings.
Constitutional or Statutory Provisions
According to U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), "It is unlawful for any person knowingly
and intentionally to possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled
substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly from a
practitioner while acting in the course of the person's professional practice, or as
otherwise authorized by this chapter."
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According to U.C.A. § 58-37A-5, "It is unlawful for any person to use, or to
possess with intent to use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow,
harvest, manufacture, compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack,
repack, store, contain, conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled
substance into the human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this
subsection is guilty of a class B misdemeanor."
According to U.C.A. § 58-37-2(l)(ii), "'Possession' or 'use' means the joint or
individual ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or
the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distribution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession
or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a possessor or user of a controlled
substance, it is not required that the person be shown to have individually possessed,
used, or controlled the substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that the person jointly
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances
with knowledge that the activity was occurring, or the controlled substance is found in a
place or under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over it." Emphasis added.
Utah Const. Art. I, § 7 says, "No person shall be deprived of life, liberty or
property, without due process of law."
Statement of Case
This case is criminal in nature and on November 2, 2009, a jury found the
Defendant guilty of the underlying offenses of possession of a controlled substance in
8

violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), a third degree felony, and possession of drug
paraphernalia in violation of U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 a class B misdemeanor. Sentence has
been imposed. The verdict and orders being final, it is now ready to be heard on the
appellate level.
Statement of Facts
1. On October 20, 2005, at 10:30 a.m. six officers of the Central Utah Narcotics Task
Force executed a search warrant. Transcript, p. 96.
2. The search warrant provided for law enforcement to search for illegal drugs,
paraphernalia, packaging material, and scales. Transcript, p. 96.
3. The location specified in the warrant was a non-moving trailer and garage-like
building, which was on the property of a residence located at 360 South Canal
Road in Elsinore, Utah. Transcript, pp. 97, 166.
4. The property and residence was that of Morris Crabb, the father of the Defendant.
The owner of the trailer in 2005 and 2006 was Trent Jensen. Transcript, pp. 96,
188, 247-248, 275, 277-278.
5. After entry into the garage, pulling things back to get in, the officers entered the
already open door of the trailer. At that time, one of the officers noticed there was
a couch, a so-called "bed" made only of blankets, some closet spaces, and a sink.
Transcript, pp. 105, 126,196-198, 212, 262-263.
6. The details about the couch and bed, however, were not in the original police
report, but were from an officer's memory after four years later and after about a
thousand cases he had handled. Transcript, pp. 130, 134.
9

7. None of the other five officers prepared reports, only Detective Ekker.

Transcript,

p. 168.
8. Other officers testified that the "bed" may have only been a fold-down or fold-out
couch, some item of furniture, or even a table. Transcript, pp. 172, 200.
9. Other witnesses testified that there was no bed in the trailer. The Defendant did
not use it as a place to stay or sleep. Transcript, pp. 260-261, 271, 280-281.
10. An officer described the trailer to be unsuitable for sleeping—"hard to imagine
anyone sleeping there." Transcript, p. 205.
11. The sink did not appear to be used and there appeared to be no water hooked up to
it. Transcript, p. 105.
12. There did not appear to be any way to heat the trailer. Transcript, p. 152.
13. There did not appear to be any locks to lock the garage or trailer. One witness,
who had been in the trailer "two dozen" times, testified, "There was no lock on
any of the doors." Transcript, pp. 184, 263, 271.
14. There did not appear to be multiple changes of clothes in the trailer. Transcript, p.
153.
15. The Defendant regularly slept in a separate home from the trailer. Transcript, pp.
263, 280, 287.
16. One of the officers allegedly found the Defendant in "bed" inside the trailer,
sleeping in sweatpants and a tee shirt. Transcript, pp.106, 132-133, 166-167.
17. Another officer testified the Defendant was in boxers or pajamas and that he was
definitely topless. Transcript, p. 178.
10

18. An officer secured the Defendant and took him to the garage, which was a
painting area for cars and doing mechanical things.

It was built in 2005.

Transcript, pp. 108, 257, 265, 269, 276.
19. At times, multiple people working with tools were there in the garage and others
were there wanting this or that fixed and in the middle of this business, there were
multiple times when the Defendant was not there. Transcript, pp. 259-260, 270,
276, 284.
20. Some of these people were Dwayne Solomon, Dustin Grledhill, and Dillon
Gledhill, all of whom had easy access to the garage and trailer as well as anyone
else. Transcript, pp. 270-271, 284.
21. The people at the garage and trailer, who were not necessarily even friends,
sometimes were doing nothing more than "just hanging out,55 or not doing
anything recognizable, or "just sitting in their car.55 Transcript, pp. 260, 266, 270.
22. The area in which the Defendant was found was not a "bedroom,55 it was an office,
which was a part of his workshop. The office and workshop had been set up for at
least six months in 2005. Transcript, pp. 149-150, 199, 257, 261, 275, 281, 283.
23. The trailer, though, had been on the property for about ten years. Transcript, p.
283.
24. It was very cluttered, dirty, filthy, and messy with a lot of garbage on the floor and
"crap everywhere,55 which mess had probably resulted from a very long time of
accumulation. Transcript, pp. 139-140, 166, 205, 211, 271.
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25. At the end of the office/trailer were tires, air compressors, paint, and things to
work on cars with. Transcript, pp. 261-262.
26. Inside the trailer, other officers alerted one another about what they believed to be
evidence. Transcript, p. 108.
27. The officers took photographs before touching the possible evidence, but the
photographs could not be located at the time of trial due to mishandling at the
evidence locker and at the police office in keeping the chain of custody.
Transcript,^.

150-151.

28. In a back closet, a detective found a broken light bulb that was, by his estimation,
perhaps an arm's reach away from the bed. Transcript, pp. 109-110.
29. Another officer was not able to recall where the closet was in relation to the bed or
to the corners of the trailer and whether the door to the trailer was open or closed.
Transcript, p. 209.
30. The broken light bulb appeared to have residue in it. Transcript, p. 109.
31. Another light bulb, which was not broken, was found at the end of a couch and in
a cubby hole or a corner and on the floor of the trailer. Transcript, pp. 112, 190,
199.
32. The light bulbs were altered, the center metal piece of the general, surrounding
metal piece being bored out. Transcript, p. 114.
33. One of the Officers, Detective Ekker, was the case agent, who was responsible for
packaging and indentifying the evidence gathered. Transcript, pp. 134-135.
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34. The case agent, however, was not the only one involved in the process of
packaging and identifying the evidence. Transcript, p. 135.
35. The two other officers were Rod Elmer and Dwight Jenkins. Transcript, p. 136.
36. The case agent could not recall which pieces of evidence he packaged and
identified. He had no notes to help him, either. Transcript, pp. 135-136.
37. The items were put in bags and taken to the Sevier County evidence locker that
has an evidence custodian administering the locker. Transcript, pp. L10, 113, 116.
38. The Defendant was taken to the county jail and he gave a urine sample to law
enforcement. Transcript, pp. 151, 178.
39. According to the case agent, the urine sample had been "transferred to Fillmore,
but it is in the freezer, it is frozen, it is in Fillmore." Transcript, p. 152.
40. The urine sample was either exculpatory evidence that was withheld, inculpatory
evidence that was not important enough to be a part of the State's case, or it was
lost through careless safekeeping of the evidence. It was never produced, even
after multiple requests by Defendant, over a six month period. Ultimately, the trial
court told the jury it was lost and never sent to the crime lab. Transcript, pp. 151152, 164, 241-243, 246-253, 302.
41. The urine sample testing dirty would have been relevant to help show the
Defendant's guilt and it testing clean would have been relevant to help show he
was not guilty. Transcript, p. 243.
42. On November 23, 2005, more than a month after the initial search, the case agent
went to the evidence locker, checked out the broken light bulb from the custodian
13

for about five minutes, and he (instead of a forensic scientist) collected residue
from it by scraping the glass with a razor. Transcript, pp. 116, 118, 140-144, 242.
43. The case agent put the residue in a small, Ziploc baggie and then placed the baggie
in a manila envelope. Transcript, pp. 118-119.
44. Captain Gary Reed witnessed the scraping and the placing of it in the baggie, but
he was not brought to trial for any questioning about what the case agent had done.
Transcript, pp. 117-119.
45. The case agent personally delivered the envelope to the State Crime Lab in Cedar
City. Transcript, pp. 116, 119, 122.
46. From the time the case agent collected it to the time he dropped it off to the lab,
the case agent was in possession of the scraping. Transcript, pp. 122-123.
47. The baggie for the scraping, however, was never returned to the evidence locker
and the trial court acknowledged that "we may not have exactly a perfect chain of
evidence or chain of custody." Transcript, p. 240-241.
48. Before any expert testimony on the nature of the residue from the broken light
bulb, the trial court allowed the residue scrapings in as evidence over the objection
of Defendant. Transcript, p. 121.
49. Before any expert testimony on the nature of the residue on the intact light bulb,
the trial court allowed the intact light bulb in as evidence over the objection of
Defendant. Transcript, ip. 121.

50. A fingerprint expert analyzed the second light bulb gathered at the scene for
fingerprints and found some, but they did not match the Defendant s fingerprints.
Transcript, pp. 147-148.
51. At the lab, the residue evidence was placed on a sheet of paper from the lab's
photocopier copy paper and not on any surface that is proven to be sterile. The
evidence was then tested. Transcript, pp. 229-231.
52. In fact, the forensic scientist admitted that "if there was any contamination, it
would have been on the piece of paper where I set the evidence on," which is then
thrown away "into a garbage can," preventing any further examination of the
paper to determine if it was contaminated. Transcript, p. 231.
53. The vials that will hold the to-be-tested substances, however, "come sealed in a
sealed thing" and "we do not reuse vials, absolutely not," in order to "make sure
there's no contamination." Transcript, pp. 230, 232.
54. The lab has certainly "scraped substances off light bulbs." This allows the forensic
scientist who analyzes the evidence to be able to "testify that there was no
contamination from scraping it off the light bulb." Transcript, p. 233.
55. After viewing the broken bulb, the forensic scientist stated that "we receive this
type of evidence in the laboratory a lot" and that she could have tested the broken
bulb. Transcript, pp. 237-238.
56. The forensic scientist herself tests over three hundred methamphetamine samples a
year. Transcript, p. 219.
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57. No admissible testimony was presented on how the broken bulb residue was
returned from the lab in Cedar City to the evidence room in Sevier County.
Transcript, pp. 240-241.
58. At the time when the evidence was gathered and at the time of trial, the color of
the residue on the broken bulb was either a burnt black or a white. The officers
called it a burnt, black color while the forensic scientist at the lab described it as
white.

Transcript, pp. 109, 113, 115, 144-145 ("black and burnt,'5 said by the

officer who scraped it out of the broken bulb), 193, and 222 ("white residue55 of
what the scientist received), 223 ("white powder"), 224, 225 ("white substance,"
as reiterated by the judge), 228.
59. When the Defendant's attorney looked at the original light bulb himself and
showed it to the forensic scientist, he said to her, "I can see—all I can see is
black." Transcript, p. 235.
60. The forensic scientist replied, "Usually burnt residue is more associated with the
marijuana pipe than it would be a meth pipe. Usually the residue of a meth pipe is
more of a white/brownish." Transcript, p. 235.
61. There is confusion over the evidentiary sample having a black colored residue and
yet testing positive for methamphetamine, which is usually white or brownish.
Transcript, p. 235.
62. The forensic scientist, though, clearly tested a white residue. Transcript, p. 235.
63. There is no way to know how old the evidence tested at the lab actually was—it
could have been "twenty" years old. Transcript, p. 236-237.
16

64. When shown the broken bulb at trial, the forensic scientist stated that she would
classify the residue "as white" or an "off-white color'

and as "browns."

Transcript, p. 236.
65. The trial court denied Defendant's proposed jury instruction that would explain
that the State has the burden in circumstantial evidence cases to eliminate all
reasonable inferences that point to innocence. Transcript, p. 303.
66. The proposed jury instruction would have read: "You are not permitted to find the
defendant guilty of the charges against him based totally on circumstantial
evidence unless the proved circumstances are not only consistent with the theory
the defendant is guilty of the crime, but cannot be reconciled with any other
rational conclusion." Transcript, p. 297.
67. The State read to the jury an instruction, saying, "I want you to focus your
attention towards the bottom of that paragraph." Transcript, 317. The State went
on to explain that "possession" element is sufficiently met if the controlled
substance is found "quote, under circumstances indicating that the person had the
ability and the intent to exercise dominion and control over it." Transcript, 317.
Summary of Argument
The Defendant should not have been found guilty because a reasonable jury must
have entertained reasonable doubt from the State's lack of ability to preclude the
reasonable alternatives and inferences of innocence in their circumstantial evidence case
against the Defendant. The trial court should have dismissed the case for an imperfect
chain of custody that not all who had handled the evidence were brought to testify at and
17

should have dismissed it due to the State's withholding of, or loss of, highly relevant and
apparently exculpatory evidence. The trial court erred in rejecting the Defendant's jury
instruction, causing prejudice against him because a verdict of not guilty would likely
have resulted.
Argument
L
THE JURY MADE A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FINDING OF GUILT BASED ON THE LACK OF
SUFFICIENT DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVING BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT KNOWINGLY AND INTENTIONALLY
POSSESSED OR USED A CONTROLLED SUBSTANCE

A.

The Defendant did not commit the actus reus of possessing a controlled
substance.
In order to be guilty of a violating of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), a defendant must

have satisfied the element to "possess or use a controlled substance analog or a controlled
substance." This is the actus reus element of the crime that must be met. According to
State v. Gonzales, 2 P. 3d 954, 957 (Utah App. 2000), "We will not make speculative
leaps across gaps in the evidence. Every element of the crime charged must be proven
beyond a reasonable doubt. To affirm the jury's verdict, we must be sure the State has
introduced evidence sufficient to support all elements of the charged crime." Internal
quotations and alterations omitted. In the current case, all the elements were not so
established.
At trial, the evidence established that the Defendant never personally had physical
possession of the evidence. He, therefore, could only have had constructive possession.
"Possession of a controlled substance sufficient to sustain a conviction need not be actual
18

but may be constructive." State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 318-319 (Utah 1985); State v.
Bingham, 732 P.2d 132, 133 (Utah 1987); State v. Layman, 953 P. 2d 782, 787 (Utah
App. 1998). However, "In cases relying on constructive possession, that burden requires
a presentation of extensive and detailed facts."

Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P. 2d

501, 504 (Utah App. 1999) (emphasis added); see also State v. Layman, 953 P. 2d 782,
(Utah App. 1998).
According to State v. Anderton, 668 P. 2d 1258, 1264 (Utah 1983), "[I]n finding
constructive possession of controlled substances in nonexclusive occupancy settings,
courts have relied on extensive and detailed factual evidence"

Emphasis added.

The

evidence at trial fell short of being extensive and detailed to establish proof beyond a
reasonable doubt of the Defendant's guilt. The evidence established that the Defendant
was found during the day in an area that multiple people also occupied during that same
time where contraband was allegedly found, but the evidence failed to exclude other
reasonable sources for the alleged drugs and paraphernalia.
The evidence linking the Defendant to the alleged methamphetamine and
paraphernalia is purely circumstantial because no one actually saw him physically
possessing them.

In this case, the State relied on the circumstantial definition of

possession found in U.C.A. § 58-37-2(l)(ii) in his closing arguments to the jury. Reading
them a specific portion of a jury instruction, he said, "I want you to focus your attention
towards the bottom of that paragraph."

Transcript, 317. He went on to explain that

"possession55 is sufficiently met if the controlled substance is found "quote, under
circumstances

indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to exercise
19

dominion and control over it." Transcript, 317. Emphasis added. The State emphasized
and made it abundantly clear that the evidence connecting the Defendant to the crime was
purely circumstantial.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]here the only evidence presented
against the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence. This is because the existence of a
reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt."

State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion)

(citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976). In this case, therefore, the State
had the burden to exclude all reasonable hypotheses of the Defendant's innocence. As
demonstrated below, the State clearly failed to do so.
The residue sample may have been contaminated'. "Before a substance connected
with the commission of a crime is admissible as evidence, there must be a showing that
the proposed exhibit is what it purports to be and is in substantially the same condition as
it was at the time of the crime." State v. Wvnia, 754 P. 2d 667, 671 (Utah App. 1988)
citing State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (1972).

The

evidence at trial established that there was a broken bulb inside of an office closet, which
bulb may have had methamphetamine residue on it. The illegal drug may not have been
on the bulb due to potential contamination from non-sterile paper used by the crime
laboratory before testing the scrapings from the broken bulb, making it not in
"substantially the same condition" as at the crime scene. State v. Madsen, 28 Utah 2d
108, 110-111 498 P.2d 670. 672 (19721
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Except for the non-sterile papei, the forensic scientist at the laboratory took
meticulous precautions to prevent contamination. These precautions included using vials
before the actual analysis that are pre-sealed in order to prevent any contamination. The
forensic scientist did not make such an effort for the printer paper she used to dump the
to-be-tested residue on.
Instead, the forensic scientist used paper that was out in the open and vulnerable to
foreign contaminants. This is especially concerning because the forensic scientist herself
receives and tests over three hundred foreign methamphetamine

samples a year.

Transcript, p. 219. The scientist admitted that the contamination would have come from
the paper she used. Transcript, p. 231.
Instead of being able to examine the paper for contaminants, such analysis was
prevented because the paper had been thrown away. The State failed to submit evidence
that would contradict the genuine possibility that the particular piece of photocopier
paper used in this case had not already been contaminated.
The State was unable to exclude the real possibility that was established by the
forensic scientist to rationally doubt the validity of the test, which showed positive for
methamphetamine, and, therefore, doubt whether the Defendant committed the actus reus
of possessing a controlled substance. There is a real chance that he was innocent. Under
these circumstances, the State failed to produce "evidence supporting a conviction5' that
would "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence." State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221,
222 (Utah 1986).
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The substance on the bulb and the substance tested were two different substances.
As previously noted, "Before a substance connected with the commission of a crime is
admissible as evidence, there must be a showing that the proposed exhibit is what it
purports to be and is in substantially the same condition as it was at the time of the
crime." State v. Wynia, 754 P. 2d 667, 671 (Utah App. 1988) citing State v. Madsen, 28
Utah 2d 108, 110-111, 498 P.2d 670, 672 (1972). Another reason to doubt the sample is
that the original residue was a burnt "black" color, as testified to by the case agent who
scraped it from the broken bulb. Transcript, pp. 144-145. The sample the forensic
scientist received was clearly not black. It was the exact opposite: a "white powder."
Transcript, p. 223.
The sample the scientist received was never even described as brown or off-white.
It was nothing close to black. The evidence shows the sample was not substantially the
same and it suggests an affirmative show of tampering. See State v. Wynia, 754 P. 2d
667, 671 (Utah App. 1988) ("it is generally presumed that the exhibits were handled with
regularity, absent an affirmative showing of bad faith or actual tampering" Emphasis
added). The State failed to offer any evidence rebutting this show of tampering and it
failed to prove that the sample was in the same condition as it had been when it was
collected. It was, therefore, an abuse of discretion on the trial court's part to admit the
sample as evidence.
The case agent was unqualified to scrape the residue and he was not supposed to
scrape it: Nowhere in the evidence at trial was there any assurance that the case agent,
who scraped the residue off the bulb, was qualified to do so or allowed to do so. Without
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such an assurance, the case agent tampered with or altered the evidence. See generally
U.C.A. § 76-8-510.5 or U.C.A. § 76-8-306. Not only may he have been unqualified, but
there was also no need for him to do so and he was not instructed to do so, either.
Testimony established that the laboratory handles broken bulbs frequently and that this
particular broken bulb could have been analyzed by the forensic scientist herself. She
could then have been able to testify, as a less prejudiced witness, that there was no
contamination in the scraping of the residue off the broken bulb.
With the fact that the evidence at trial established two different substances
involved, the State failed to contradict the reasonable inference that the case agent could
have been the one who unintentionally, or even intentionally, contaminated the evidence.
This is especially so considering that the scrapings happened in close proximity to the
evidence locker where illegal drug evidence is brought in and regularly kept.
The State failed to bring in Captain Reed's testimony to exclude the doubt that the
case agent did not intentionally scrape a different substance into the evidence baggie
when Captain Reed was watching.

Again, the State failed to produce "evidence

supporting a conviction" that would 'preclude every reasonable

hypothesis

of

innocence," (State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)), which was required after the
evidence demonstrated that the sample scraped and the sample delivered to the scientist
were not the same.
The investigation and safekeeping of evidence was careless and raises legitimate
doubt as to the believability of it. Finally, the investigation by the officers is fraught with
reasons to doubt its validity. The Due Process Clause provides two forms of protection to
23

a criminal defendant.

The Federal Due Process Clause, made applicable to the States

through the Fourteenth Amendment, states: "No State shall...deprive any person of life,
liberty, or property, without due process of law." U.S. Constamend. XIV, § 1, cl. 2; Utah
Const. Art. I, § 7. Due Process guarantees a defendant access to evidence "that is either
material to the guilt of the defendant or relevant to the punishment to be imposed" so as
to ensure that "defendants [are] afforded a meaningful opportunity to present a complete
defense.'5 California v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d
413 (1984). This guarantee provides the defendant access to all evidence that "might be
expected to play a significant role in the suspect's defense." I d at 488, 104 S.Ct. at 2534.
To meet this standard, "evidence must both possess an [apparent] exculpatory value...and
be of such a nature that the defendant would be unable to obtain comparable evidence by
other reasonably available means." Id at 489, 104 S.Ct. at 2534 (emphasis added)
(citation omitted).
In this case, the Defendant was deprived of Due Process rights by a number of
deprivations of significantly exculpatory pieces of evidence. First, only one of the six
officers made a report about the arrest, depriving the Defendant of exculpatory evidence
that could have attacked the credibility and accuracy of the original report.
Second, the officers could not recall the details accurately and they contradicted
each other, depriving the Defendant of a reliable investigation into the facts of the case.
Third, and most importantly, they lost the Defendant's urine sample and crime
scene photographs, all of which were essential to a proper investigation and which would
have played a significant role in the Defendant's defense. The pictures and urine sample
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had apparent exculpatory value in showing the Defendant was not guilty of either using
or possessing the drugs and paraphernalia. They were of such a nature that the Defendant
could not obtain comparable evidence by any other available means—a subsequent urine
test would not have had any value in showing the lack of methamphetamine in his system
if it were taken once the need for it became known, which was years after the original
sample was taken; no pictures could have been produced later to show the exact
placement of the supposedly incriminating evidence away from the Defendant because
they had been put into evidence bags and taken away. The loss of all of these pieces of
evidence was a clear violation of his Due Process rights and should have been sufficient
to have the trial dismissed.
In addition, as previously discussed, the case agent scraped evidence out of a bulb
that was fully within the capability and qualifications of the laboratory's forensic scientist
to do; the only need for him to do it would have been to plant false evidence.
In the end, the officers were sloppy and untrustworthy, and they violated his Due
Process rights in preventing him from putting on a complete defense with apparently
exculpatory evidence that was either withheld or lost.
Thus, based on the multiple reasons to doubt the validity of the test sample and to
doubt the reliability of the investigation, the State failed to demonstrate beyond a
reasonable doubt that the residue was methamphetamine and that the Defendant
possessed any controlled substance at the time of his arrest. The State failed to "preclude
every reasonable hypothesis of innocence" (State v. HilK 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986))
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at trial in this case, a case of circumstantial evidence tying the Defendant to the purported
drugs and paraphernalia.
B.

The Defendant did not knowingly

or intentionally

possess a controlled

substance.
In order to be guilty of a violation of U.C.A. § 58-37-8(2)(A)(I), a defendant must
"knowingly and intentionally" possess or use a controlled substance. This is the mens
rea element of the crime. For the following reasons, the State failed to prove beyond a
reasonable doubt that both (1) the Defendant knew of the existence of the potentially
incriminating evidence and (2) that he had any intent to possess the evidence for any
purpose.

The factual circumstances of the case must permit the inference that the

Defendant intended to use the drugs as his own.
In the face of a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, "whether a sufficient
nexus between the accused and the contraband exists depends upon the facts and
circumstances of each case." State v. Fox, 709 P. 2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985); State v.
Watts, 750 P. 2d 1219, 1224 (Utah 1988). The existence of a sufficient nexus to prove
constructive possession is a "highly fact-sensitive determination." State v. Layman, 985
P. 2d 911,913 (Utah 199).
The Utah courts have previously held that many of the factors indicating
possession, by themselves, are insufficient to establish the requisite nexus. Persons who
"might know of the whereabouts of illicit drugs and who might even have access to them,
but who have no intent to obtain and use the drugs can not [sic] be convicted of
possession of a controlled substance." State v. Fox, 709 P. 2d 316, 319 (Utah 1985).
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Emphasis added

See Fox, 709 P 2d at 320 (holding that co-occupancy of a house where

marijuana was bemg grown, absent other evidence, was insufficient to establish a nexus),
Anderton, 668 P 2d at 1264 (holding that co-ownership and co-occupancy of a home
were insufficient to establish a nexus), Spanish Fork City v Bryan, 1999 UT App 61, ^
2, 10, 975 P 2d 501 (holdmg that co-occupancy of bedroom where drug paraphernalia
was found was insufficient to establish a nexus), State v Salas, 820 P 2d 1386, 1389
(Utah App 1991) (holdmg that ownership and co-occupancy of a vehicle, along with an
anonymous informant's tip, was insufficient to establish a nexus)
this case was multiple occupancies of the workshop

One factor present m

The Defendant's proximity to the

contraband is disputable because he was asleep when awakened by the officers and the
evidence established that the paraphernalia may not have even been m plam view since
one was in a closet and the other was m a cubby hole on the ground
The State failed

to establish a sufficient

nexus and demonstrate

beyond

a

reasonable doubt that the residue did not come from a different source than the
Defendant

The factual evidence at trial did not establish the age of the residue, but

expert testimony established that it could have been on the bulb for as many as "twenty"
years prior to the date the Defendant was arrested

Transcript, p 236-237

The State

failed to bring any facts or evidence to contradict the likelihood that the residue was of an
older ongm

It, therefore, failed to "preclude" (State v Hill 727 P 2d 221, 222 (Utah

1986)) the residue as coming from a source besides the Defendant, such as the original
owner of the trailer, by any facts or evidence to the contrary
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The evidence established that the broken bulb was not the Defendant's.

The facts

and evidence at trial established that a light bulb belonged to another person.

A

fingerprint expert examined the bulb, "found some fingerprints" (Transcript, pp. 147148) on it, but they did not belong to the Defendant.

No other facts or evidence

contradicting the ownership of this bulb as being the person who touched it was brought
to trial and certainly no facts or evidence were brought to establish the Defendant as the
one who touched or owned the light bulbs.

No facts or evidence established the

Defendant had used any tools to alter the bulbs.
The only fact the State successfully established by witness testimony was that
someone else had used the bulb in which to burn a residue.

By this evidence of

ownership or use by another, the State contradicted its own allegation that the Defendant
intended to possess or use the possibly incriminating bulbs.
The State clearly failed to "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of innocence"
(State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah 1986)) because the person whose
fingerprints on the paraphernalia is more likely the criminal than the Defendant since the
Defendant was never seen touching it, possessing drugs on his person, having them in his
system, or doing any other kind of incriminating behavior.
The Defendant's potentially

inculpatory or exculpatory? urine sample was lost.

The State could have helped demonstrate intent to use a controlled substance if it showed
(1) that the alleged methamphetamine on the purported light bulb paraphernalia was of
recent origin or proximity in time to the Defendant, (2) that the residue was more likely
methamphetamine through non-contaminating procedures, and (3) that the Defendant
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mtended to use the paraphernalia for the purpose of inhaling methamphetamme if the lost
or withheld urine sample the Defendant had given tested positive for methamphetamme
Because the State failed to adequately show any of these, it also failed to establish any
mtent on Defendant's part to intentionally possess a controlled substance
The State failed
methamphetamme,

to exclude

the other possible

including the first owner of the trailer

sources for

the bulbs

and

The State failed in its burden

to show the residue had been burned in recent origin or that it had any proximity in time
to the Defendant other than the residue on die bulbs bemg present in the same office that
he was in

In fact, testimony established that the trailer m which the bulbs with residue

were found had been on the property for ten years and had a mess in it that had
accumulated over a long period of time The ongmal owner of the trailer could have left
the purported methamphetamme residue there from ten years m 1he past

The State

brought no evidence to suggest the trailer had been cleaned out and put mto pristine
condition when Mr Crabb, Sr allowed the trailer to be placed on his property
gave no evidence that the prior owner did not have a criminal history
methamphetamme

They
for

No evidence was presented to suggest the light bulbs themselves

were of recent makmg

And, agam, no evidence that the forensic scientist was aware of

could establish that the methamphetamme was not ten years old or older

The State

clearly failed to preclude reasonable alternatives for the source of the residue and bulbs
State v Hill 727 P 2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah 1986)
Placement of the bulbs in the mess demonstrates that they could have been around
since the first owner

The bulbs were found among the mess m places within the trailer
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that demonstrate they may not have been placed there recently and that they may not
have been in plain view. One may have found its way into a cubby hole at the end of a
couch on a floor and the other stationed away inside of a closet.

Their placement

indicates they were not necessarily of recent origin and were pushed to the sides as the
messes accumulated, not being as visible as something new in the middle of the room.
This gives reason to doubt that the Defendant possessed them. One of the bulbs was even
broken, suggesting that over time it could have been smashed by the clutter that was
accumulating and ignored because it was not clearly visible. Most people pick up and
throw away dangerous items such as broken glass / / they see it.

This leads to the

inevitable conclusion that the State failed to preclude reasonable inferences that he was
not the owner or possessor of the alleged contraband, which the State would have to have
done in this circumstantial case. State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah
1986).
The State failed
methamphetamine,

to exclude the other possible

sources for the bulbs and

including the other people who came to the trailer, "We note that

neither possibilities nor probabilities can substitute for certainty beyond a reasonable
doubt." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan. 1999 UT App 61, f 10, 975 P. 2d 501, 504. The
State failed to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant was the only one
who could have possessed the contraband—he is a mere probability. Multiple people
were going in and out of the trailer and garage area, both of which were easily accessible
and not locked.

The people frequenting the area could very well have been the

possessors of the drug and paraphernalia. Oftentimes, they were doing nothing. When
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people have nothing to do, they frequently resort to drugs and alcohol to make the time
go by faster. The State did nothing to bring in evidence that the others frequenting the
workshop were not methamphetamine users. Excluding them as the possible sources for
the methamphetamine would have been very simple and brief using histories. The State
was required to do so under State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (Utah 1986).
In State v. Salas, 820 P. 2d 1386, 1388 (Utah App. 1991), the court listed multiple
factors that the State should have proved after evidence of multiple occupants to the
buildings came in: "In order to find that the accused was in possession of drugs found in
an automobile he was not the sole occupant of, and did not have sole access to, there
must be other evidence to buttress such an inference. The law has recognized several
particular evidentiary factors as linking or tending to link an accused with drugs. These
include incriminating statements, suspicious or incriminating behavior, sale of drugs, use
of drugs, proximity of defendant to location of drugs, drugs in plain view, and drugs on
defendant's person."

The State failed to bring in any evidence of incriminating

statements or behavior, any sale or purchase of drugs, any use of drags by the Defendant,
or that the drugs were on the Defendant's person. It also did not clearly establish that the
drugs were in plain view. Under these circumstances, the Defendant's innocence was a
very real likelihood.
Importantly, the State also did not bring in any criminal histories of the named
people, who were common visitors and who was the owner of the trailer at the time:
Dwayne Solomon, Dustin Gledhill, Dillon Gledhill, or Trent Jensen.

Each of these

individuals could have been methamphetamine users who were responsible for the tossed
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away paraphernalia. Others who had just been hanging out could have been the users,
too. The evidence, therefore, failed to exclude the reasonable doubt that the drugs and
paraphernalia were someone else's and the evidence of fingerprints showed clearly that
they were, in fact, someone else's.

There are at least four reasonable hypotheses:

Dwayne did it, Dustin owned them, Dillon smoked it, and Trent left them. This set of
facts and reasonable possibilities clearly fail to "preclude every reasonable hypothesis of
innocence." State v. Hill 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986).

n.
T H E J U R Y MADE A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FINDING O F G U I L T BASED ON T H E L A C K O F
SUFFICIENT D I R E C T AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE P R O V I N G BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT T H A T T H E D E F E N D A N T POSSESSED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA.

A.

The Defendant did not possess drug paraphernalia.
As previously noted in Argument I, A, there was not sufficient direct or

circumstantial evidence to prove that the Defendant "possessed" drug paraphernalia. In
fact, the evidence shows it was possessed by someone else. The fingerprints show it and
the lack of the Defendant's fingerprints on the evidence demonstrates it was not his. The
location of the evidence also demonstrates it was discarded and perhaps even hidden
among the mess.

The Defendant never stated the evidence was his and he has no

criminal history of using methamphetamine. There were multiple other potential sources
for the evidence besides the Defendant.

They could have included any number of the

people who came to the garage and had free access to the office room to discard their
used drugs. The State failed to exclude all of the named individuals as sources for the
evidence by showing any lack of criminal history for methamphetamine. The State was
32

obligated in this case of proving guilt by circumstantial evidence to "preclude" (State v.
Hill, 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986)) the reasonable inferences that the other sources
could very well have been guilty, and not the Defendant. There was plenty of reasonable
doubt that any reasonable jury would have had to entertain and wrongfully disregard in
order to find the Defendant guilty. Under these circumstances, the jury made a clearly
erroneous finding of guilt and their verdict should be overturned.
III.
T H E JURY MADE A CLEARLY ERRONEOUS FINDING OF GUILT BASED ON THE LACK OF
SUFFICIENT DIRECT AND CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE PROVING BEYOND A
REASONABLE DOUBT THAT THE DEFENDANT POSSESSED DRUG PARAPHERNALIA WITH
INTENT TO USE IT, AND TO USE IT FOR AT LEAST ONE OF TWENTY-TWO PURPOSES.

A.

The evidence did not prove the Defendant possessed drug paraphernalia to
use it.
"A guilty verdict is not legally valid if it is based solely on inferences that give rise

to only remote or speculative possibilities of guilt." Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 975 P.
2d 501 (Utah App. 1999).

Assuming the residue on the light bulbs was

methamphetamine that had been smoked, assuming that the test of the residue was not
contaminated, assuming that the residue and bulbs were of a recent nature, and assuming
that the Defendant actually knew about their existence, the Defendant can only have been
guilty of violating U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 if the State brought in enough evidence to
eliminate all reasonable doubt as to whether the Defendant intended on using the drug
paraphernalia. Remote or speculative possibilities are insufficient. Even assuming, but
not conceding, the Defendant most certainly knew of the existence of the items and their
potential for illegal use, "Knowledge and ability to possess do not eq[ual possession where
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there is no evidence of intent to make use of that knowledge and ability." Spanish Fork
City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 6l,1f 7, 975 P. 2d 501, 503; State v. Fox, 709 P.2d 316, 319
(Utah 1985).
The statute states, "It is unlawful for any person to use, or to possess with intent to
use, drug paraphernalia to plant, propagate, cultivate, grow, harvest, manufacture,
compound, convert, produce, process, prepare, test, analyze, pack, repack, store, contain,
conceal, inject, ingest, inhale or otherwise introduce a controlled substance into the
human body in violation of this chapter. Any person who violates this subsection is guilty
of a class B misdemeanor." U.C.A. § 58-37A-5.
The State submitted no evidence that the light bulbs were the Defendant's that he
used to inhale methamphetamine other than some proximity to them at the time the police
entered the trailer. The fingerprints proved the bulbs were not his. The State failed to
prove that he actually owned anything within the trailer portion where the bulbs were
found. At most, the evidence showed that the workshop and office were areas where the
Defendant usually worked, along with other people.

The State never submitted any

confession showing ownership or use of the bulbs, it never established that others did not
own the bulbs, and there is room to doubt that the State even established by the evidence
that the bulbs were in fact paraphernalia since the residue tested might have been
contaminated by the paper used at the laboratory.

What we are left with is the

speculative possibility that someone—the Defendant—at the workshop may have been
guilty. But "there is a difference between a reasonable inference and merely speculating
about the possibilities." State v. Hester. 2000 Utah Ct. App 159, ^ 16, 3 P.3d 725.
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Because the State failed to show the Defendant had even touched the bulbs, it also
failed to show that the Defendant intended to use the bulbs for any purpose. Because the
State failed to show that the Defendant had ever even touched methamphetamine, it also
failed to show that the Defendant intended to use the bulbs for any purpose, including the
inhalation of methamphetamine. His intent in this regard is mere speculation.
In addition, the law requires the State to have shown that the Defendant had an
intent to exercise dominion or control over the paraphernalia, however, if it was
paraphernalia, then it appeared to be discarded by where it was located and by the burnt
residue on it.

Discarding the contraband shows no intent to exercise any control or

dominion over the items discarded, rejected, or abandoned. Thus, the State clearly failed
to meet its burden that the Defendant had amy intent to do anything with the bulbs, and,
therefore failed to meet an element of U.C.A. § 58-37A-5 for which he was wrongfully
convicted. At most, there are inferences giving rise to speculations of guilt based on the
inadequate circumstantial evidence and the sloppy investigation in this case.
IV.
T H E T R I A L C O U R T I N C O R R E C T L Y I N T E R P R E T E D T H E PLAIN LANGUAGE O F T H E U T A H
STATUTE § 5 8 - 3 7 A - 5 W H E N I T A L L O W E D T H E J U R Y ' S FINDING T O R E M A I N AS
SUFFICIENT W H E N T H E J U R Y ' S FINDING E N T I R E L Y FAILED T O M E N T I O N W H E T H E R T H E
D E F E N D A N T HAD ANY INTENT T O USE T H E P A R T I C U L A R D R U G PARAPHERNALIA.

A.

The Defendant is not guilty because the j u r y did not find an element of the
crime.
A defendant must be found guilty beyond a reasonable doubt on all the elements

of a crime. Spanish Fork City v. Bryan, 1999 UT App 61,1f 5, 975 P. 2d 501, 502; State
v. Piep. 2004 UT 850, \ 11, 84 P.3d 853; State v. Larsen. 2000 UT App 106,1f 10, 999
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P.2d 1252. This is "to ensure that our review of the evidence does not encourage the
indulging of inference upon inference, or, worse, the indulging of inference upon
assumption." State v. Layman, 953 P. 2d 782, 791 (Utah App. 1998).
It is even a state constitutional requirement implicit in "constitutions...[which]
recognize the fundamental principles that are deemed essential for the protection of life
and liberty." Davis v. United States, 160 U.S. 469, 488, 16 S.Ct 353, 40 L.Ed. 499
(1895). (1895). The Utah Constitution requires such. Utah Const., Art. I, § 7 ("No
person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property, without due process of law.55).
Emphasis added.
In the current matter, on count two, possession of paraphernalia, the jury only
found the Defendant guilty of "possession of drug paraphernalia, a Class B
misdemeanor,55 (Transcript, p.338) not possession "with intent to use[] drug
paraphernalia55 for any of the twenty-two specified "purpose[s].55 U.C.A. § 58-37A-5.
The jury failed to find the Defendant guilty of one of the elements of the crime. The trial
court even approved of the legally deficient finding when it said, "It appears to the Court
that the verdict is appropriate.55 Transcript, p. 340. Because an essential element had not
been found, the Defendant is not guilty of possession of drug paraphernalia with the
intent to use it. Accordingly, the judgment should be reversed.
V.
T H E TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION WHEN IT DENIED DEFENDANT'S MOTION
TO DISMISS THE CHARGE OF POSSESSION BASED ON A BROKEN CHAIN OF EVIDENCE
WHEN THE COURT ITSELF STATED THAT "WE MAY NOT HAVE EXACTLY A PERFECT
CHAIN OF EVIDENCE OR CHAIN OF CUSTODY."

A.

The broken chain of custody led to the wrongful admission of evidence.
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According to the Utah Supreme Court, there is "no error where chain of custody
was established by having all persons who handled evidence testify." State v. Madsen,
498 P. 2d 670 (Utah 1972).
Here, there was a broken chain of evidence because no one testified about how the
baggie with the residue came from the laboratory to the evidence locker and how the
evidence came from the evidence locker to the trial court. The trial court itself stated that
"we may not have exactly a perfect chain of evidence or chain of custody." Transcript,
p. 241. The Defendant motioned to dismiss the trial based on the error of the broken
chain of custody. The trial court denied it, but under State v. Madsen there was error and
the Defendant's verdict should be reversed on these grounds.
VI.
T H E CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PLAIN ERROR OR
ABUSE OF DISCRETION BECAUSE OF THE SPOLIATION OF EVIDENCE WHEN THE STATE
FAILED TO BRING FORTH A URINE SAMPLE IT INITIALLY SAID WAS LOST, BUT THEN
REPRESENTED IT WAS STILL IN EXISTENCE.

A.

The trial court erred in not dismissing the case due to the State destroying
potentially exculpatory evidence.
Plain error occurs when a trial court does not dismiss a case because there was (1)

error (2) that is plain (3) that affected substantial rights of the Defendant and (4) which
error seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial
proceedings.
As previously discussed in Argument I, A with the law cited (including California
v. Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984), the
Defendant was taken to the county jail and he gave a urine sample to law^ enforcement.
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Transcript, pp. 151, 178.

According to the case agent, the urine sample had been

"transferred to Fillmore, but it is in the freezer, it is frozen, it is in Fillmore."

Transcript,

p. 152.
The urine sample was either exculpatory evidence that was withheld, inculpatory
evidence that was not important enough to be a part of the State's case, or it was lost
through careless safekeeping of the evidence. It was never produced, even after multiple
requests by Defendant, over a six month period. Ultimately, the trial court told the jury it
was lost and never sent to the crime lab. Transcript, pp. 151-152, 164, 241-243, 246-253,
302. This was plain error or an abuse of discretion after the testimony that the urine
sample had been sent to Fillmore.
Here, the urine sample testing dirty would have been highly relevant to help show
the Defendant's guilt and it testing clean would have been highly relevant to help show
he was not guilty. Transcript, p. 243. The State's failure to produce it at trial was a
spoliation of evidence. In essence, the State's actions toward it were tantamount to the
destruction of evidence in violation of the Defendant's Due Process rights. California v.
Trombetta. 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984). The case
must be overturned and the jury verdict reversed because this was clearly error, it was
plain, it affected the Defendant's substantial rights, and seriously affected the fairness of
the proceedings against the Defendant.
VII.
T H E CASE SHOULD HAVE BEEN DISMISSED UNDER THE DOCTRINE OF PLAIN ERROR
BECAUSE OF THE STATE WITHHOLDING POTENTIALLY EXCULPATORY EVIDENCE IN
THE FORM OF A NON-PRODUCED URINE SAMPLE THAT HAD BEEN REQUESTED TWICE
BY MOTIONS AND WHICH THE STATE CONTINUED TO ASSERT WAS NOT LOST AT TRIAL.
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Based on the law stated above (including, but not limited to California v.
Trombetta, 467 U.S. 479, 485, 104 S.Ct. 2528, 2532, 81 L.Ed.2d 413 (1984) and the
reasons stated in Argument I, A and VI, the State's withholding of evidence violated the
Defendant's rights and under the doctrine of plain error—the trial court clearly erred in
not dismissing the case after the evidence showed that the State in fact had the highly
relevant and potentially exculpatory evidence, but were simply refusing to produce it.
VIII.
T H E T R I A L C O U R T E R R E D IN R E J E C T I N G T H E D E F E N D A N T ' S P R O P O S E D JURY
I N S T R U C T I O N T H A T IS CONSISTENT W I T H CASE L A W R E G A R D I N G T H E S T A T E ' S NEED
T O P R E C L U D E A L L REASONABLE POSSIBILITIES O R A L T E R N A T E H Y P O T H E S E S O F
I N N O C E N C E IN CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE CASES IN O R D E R F O R A DEFENDANT T O B E
FOUND GUILTY BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT.

A.

The Defendant's jury instruction should have been used.
The Utah Supreme Court has stated that "[w]here the only evidence presented

against the defendant is circumstantial, the evidence supporting a conviction must
preclude every reasonable hypothesis of irmocence. This is because the existence of a
reasonable hypothesis of innocence necessarily raises a reasonable doubt as to the
defendant's guilt."

State v. Hilj 727 P.2d 221, 222 (Utah 1986) (plurality opinion)

(citing State v. Romero, 554 P.2d 216, 219 (Utah 1976).
The State read to the jury an instruction, saying, "I want you to focus your
attention towards the bottom of that paragraph." Transcript, 317. The State went on to
explain that "possession" element is sufficiently met if the controlled substance is found
"quote, under circumstances indicating that the person had the ability and the intent to
exercise dominion and control over it."

Transcript,
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317.

This focus is clearly

..:;;.•
referring to "circumstances

: • - . : . to "focus" on the language o! tlu- instruction
Mu M;iti made it abundantly clear thai a was .dying on

circumstantial e\ idence to coi meet tl: te Defei ida i it to tl ic z\ lai ged ci ii nes
In response, the Defendant offei ed a jury instruction

It read: "You at e not

permitted to find., the defendant guilt} of the • charges agaii i.st 1 iii t i based t : talh - 311
cm iimsliintml r* hlrnre unless lite pioved circumstances are not only consistent with the
theory the defendant is guilty of the crime,
rational conclusion

1

;•

•,

consistent with State v. Hill

^
(

* h r tnai

* he recou i-u" ^ ^ ,
i

.n\

her

.«n<_'u<ii\ ueic, 11 i^

i-nn howevei. rejected 'l^ I )efendant's proposed

j u r y instructioi 1 that would explain thai (lie Stale has tlie buulen 111 i/mjuni'ilnnlial
(,

,

L t,

.,%1)

,

^ ionable inferences that point to innocence. This w a s

ermi and not u^UKlim* n \\<r* prejudicial to the Defendant because, lacking it. the jury
found h i m guilty 3 v ei 11. tl 101 1 gh tl; i..ei e \ \i ei e :leai i> altei nate. at id t easoiiable inferences of
innocence. In othei words, '"the jury would likely have found him not guilt} v\ ith the
instruction.
Conclusion
Reversal is appropriate "only when the evidence, so viewed, is sufficiently
inconiliKiu' * iiihcn'ntlv nnpinhalili' 1 Ii*• 1 ira^nimhli nnnil1, must have entertained a
reasonable doubt that itu defendant committed the eniue o! which he s\a> •- on\ irt:d "
State v. Salas. 820 P „u i »-

\n. \ H

^late v .miniMm

I I r";" <' " ^ I*>«*>>, accoul Siau. >. .i-na^ ^AJ P.id V02, 905 (Liah App. 1990); State v.
Jamison, 767 P 2d 134, 117 ft Hah App 1089)
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In this case at trial, because of the following reasons, reversal is appropriate. The
jury must have entertained reasonable doubt as to the Defendant's guilt—(1) the
Defendant was never seen touching the evidence, having the evidence on his person, or
doing any other kind of incriminating behavior, (2) he never tested positive for
methamphetamine—ever,

(3)

he

never

had

any

criminal

history

of

using

methamphetamine, (4) he never confessed to even knowing of the light bulbs in all of the
mess of the office, which bulbs were not necessarily even in plain view, (5) someone
else's fingerprints were on the tested light bulb, (6) the Defendant was not the sole
occupant of the workshop that many others worked in, hung out in, and did nothing in,
(7) the State failed to show the other occupants, who had free access to the constantly
open office, were not users of methamphetamine that had used the light bulbs by at least
producing their criminal histories, (8) the age of the methamphetamine was never
established and could have been as old as twenty years and coming from the original
owner of the trailer and not the Defendant, (9) and the very existence of the
methamphetamine was in reasonable doubt due to an admittedly real contamination
potential at the laboratory.
Based on the numerous examples of reasonable doubt, no reasonable jury could
have found the Defendant guilty of the crimes for which he was convicted. As such, this
Court should reverse the verdict and acquit the Defendant.
Further, "the erroneous admission of evidence, standing alone, is insufficient to set
aside a verdict unless it had a substantial influence in bringing about the verdict."
Bambrough v. Bethers. 552 P.2d 1286 (Utah 1976); State v. Echevarrieta, 621 P.2d 709
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(Utah 1980). The admission of evidence in this case was erroneous, due to the real
contamination problems and broken chain of evidence Without the erroneously admitted

would clearly have resulted in a different verdict (or outcome).
I lie rejection of the Defendant' s jiu j T ii isti tic: tion caused the sari le pi ejudice and a
guilty verdict. T h e plain error in not dismissing the case for spoliation of evidence or for
the withholding of exculpatory 7 evidence in the urine sample after the case agent testified
vhei e it acti ialb

* as ei i 01 and cai rsed a gi lilty v ei cii, ::1,

' 1 1 le p u > fa

t : find at i

essential element of possession; therefore, the possession charge(s) should hav e beei 1
dismissed.
For all these reasons, the verdict must b e reversed a n d the Defendant treated as
innocent.
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